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Consider this personal jurisdiction quandary: A growing 
Arizona company wants to start expanding into other states.  The 
company is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place 
of business in Arizona.  It decides to make the leap and begins 
registering to do business in a few surrounding states, including 
New Mexico.  The registration seems straightforward and does 
not mention anything about jurisdiction.  After the registration, 
but before conducting any business in New Mexico, a Kentucky 
resident decides to sue the Arizona-based corporation.  The suit 
is based on an alleged tort occurring in Utah, and the plaintiff files 
the lawsuit in New Mexico.  According to current New Mexico 
law, without any other contacts with the state, the New Mexico 
court would have personal jurisdiction over the corporation.1 
In several states, a corporation may be subject to personal 
jurisdiction based purely on its registration, which leads to 
inconsistent results and unfair rulings.2  Consequently, this 
Article seeks to accomplish two goals.  First, it will demonstrate 
* University of Arkansas School of Law, J.D. expected May 2021, Arkansas State
University, B.A. 2018.  Many thanks to Professor Alan Trammell for his thoughtful 
suggestions and guidance in reviewing prior drafts of this Comment.  I am also indebted to 
the helpful encouragement of Anna Van Der Like.  Special thanks to my friends and family, 
I could not have completed this without your support. 
1. See Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018); see also
Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 861 P.2d 270, 273-74 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). 
2. See Bexis, Updating Our Post-Bauman 50-State Survey on General Jurisdiction by
Consent, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (Nov. 5, 2018), [https://perma.cc/LAQ9-N6KZ] (fifty-
state survey on the use of consent by registration).  
For purposes of this Article, it is unimportant that only a minority of states may actually 
allow consent by registration.  Unless this practice is directly overruled or uniformly 
abrogated, states will still have the ability to retroactively allow consent by registration at 
any point, either through the legislative or judicial bodies. 
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the current problems with the use of registration statutes to obtain 
personal jurisdiction over defendants.  These problems include 
the broad nature of the consent, the lack of clarity on the effects 
of registration, the use of coercion to obtain a business’s 
registration, and the due process concerns following the U.S. 
Supreme Court cases Goodyear3 and Daimler.4  These issues are 
especially concerning when taking into consideration the 
Supreme Court’s focus on fairness and reasonableness.5  Second, 
this Article encourages courts to find solutions for obtaining 
personal jurisdiction with the help of the Supreme Court’s 
guidance without unfairly utilizing the conduit of a business’s 
registration.  
Part II discusses the evolution of personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence and the recent narrowing of both specific and 
general jurisdiction.  Through this narrowing, the Supreme Court 
created a jurisdictional gap, leading courts to use other means of 
obtaining personal jurisdiction.  One method that has recently 
received increased scrutiny is the practice of using a business’s 
registration to serve as consent to personal jurisdiction.6  This Part 
concludes with a historical discussion of the use of consent by 
registration. 
Part III analyzes the issues with the consent by registration 
method without considering the due process implications.  First, 
this Part compares and contrasts the practice of consent by 
registration with other accepted methods of consenting to 
personal jurisdiction.  Second, it examines the lack of clarity in 
the registration statutes themselves as to the jurisdictional effects 
of a business’s registration.  Finally, this Part demonstrates that 
these registration statutes and other state laws effectively coerce 
companies into registering with the state, thereby casting doubt as 
to the validity of the consent itself.  
Part IV examines the due process concerns of consent by 
registration following Goodyear and Daimler.7  This Article 
argues that these two cases, especially Daimler, reject the idea 
3. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
4. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-39 (2014).
5. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
6. See infra Part II.
7. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39.
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that a corporation should be subject to general jurisdiction in 
every state in which it does business.8  It then notes that using 
consent by registration effectively circumvents Daimler’s 
holding because, if consent by registration continues to be 
allowed, a business will be subject to personal jurisdiction in any 
state where it is registered.9  Finally, Part IV establishes that it is 
impossible to reconcile the practice of consent by registration 
with the ultimate touchstone of personal jurisdiction—fairness 
and reasonableness.10 
While the use of a business’s registration as consent to 
personal jurisdiction made sense in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries,11 this practice is outdated and unworkable in 
our modern global society.  When considering the problems with 
consent by registration in conjunction with the due process 
concerns recently enunciated by the Court, a company’s 
registration in the state should not be used as a conduit to obtain 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.12 
II.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION & HISTORY OF
CONSENT BY REGISTRATION 
Personal jurisdiction is the court’s power “to assert judicial 
authority over” a particular party, typically a defendant.13  
Historically, personal jurisdiction was not a controversial or 
contested area of the law, as courts used a territorial approach, 
exemplified by the seminal case of Pennoyer v. Neff.14  This 
territorial approach stood for the principle that “every State 
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and 
property within its territory” and that a state does not have 
jurisdiction over defendants not within its territory.15  However, 
8. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
11. States would allow the registration to serve as a proxy for presence in the era
dominated by the territorial approach to personal jurisdiction.  See Brown v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 632 (2d Cir. 2016). 
12. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
13. 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 6.01 (2020). 
14. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
15. Id. at 722.
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this approach proved insufficient in a modern, more mobile 
society.  As the national and global economies became 
increasingly interdependent, the courts shifted away from a 
territorial approach of personal jurisdiction in favor of a dispute-
based approach rooted in notions of fundamental fairness.16  In 
1945, the Supreme Court outlined this new approach to personal 
jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, basing 
personal jurisdiction on the location of the dispute itself and not 
purely on the defendant’s location.17  Since then, two distinct 
types of personal jurisdiction have emerged: specific jurisdiction 
and general jurisdiction.18  
Specific jurisdiction is found explicitly in International Shoe 
and applies to causes of action that directly arise from contacts 
within the forum state.19  The test used for specific jurisdiction 
examines a defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the forum state 
and whether the lawsuit “offend[s] ‘traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.’”20  Specific jurisdiction allows lawsuits 
from a particular party that assert a particular cause of action.21  If 
the defendant’s contacts in the dispute meet the “minimum 
contacts” standard, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant.22 
The second type of personal jurisdiction, general 
jurisdiction, also derives from International Shoe.23  General 
jurisdiction, intended to mimic presence within a state, relates to 
disputes where the defendant’s activities within the forum state 
are “continuous and systematic” in a manner that renders the 
defendant subject to the authority of the forum state.24  This type 
of jurisdiction, sometimes referred to as “all-purpose 
16. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. See id. at 319.
18. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (introducing the concepts of 
specific and general jurisdiction to the personal jurisdiction doctrine). 
19. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; see also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 18, at
1136. 
20. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
21. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
22. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; see, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014).
23. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317; see also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 18, at
1136. 
24. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
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jurisdiction,” vests the court with personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant in any lawsuit from any plaintiff.25  In other words, 
general jurisdiction would confer personal jurisdiction regardless 
of whether the claim arose from within the forum state or whether 
the plaintiff resides in the forum state.26 
International Shoe and later Supreme Court decisions rooted 
the concept of personal jurisdiction in “traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”27  In World-Wide Volkswagen, the 
Court expanded on the role fairness and reasonableness play in 
personal jurisdiction analysis, elucidating a four-factor test.28  The 
Court has continued to reaffirm the importance of fairness and 
reasonableness in evaluating personal jurisdiction.29  This 
fairness doctrine, while sometimes neglected by courts, should 
always be used as a touchstone in informing a personal 
jurisdiction analysis.30 
However, since International Shoe, the Court has 
significantly reduced the scope of specific jurisdiction by adding 
additional requirements to the two-part analysis discussed 
above.31  One example includes requiring the defendant to 
“purposefully avail[] itself” to the benefits of the forum state.32  
In the last decade, after failing to address it for twenty-seven 
years, the Court narrowed the scope of general jurisdiction, 
25. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
26. See id.
27. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940));
see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (articulating 
factors for evaluating the fairness of exerting personal jurisdiction). 
28. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.  The Court listed four factors in
evaluating fairness: (1) “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” (2) “the 
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief . . . at least when that interest 
is not adequately protected by the plaintiff’s power to choose the forum,” (3) “the interstate 
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies[,]” and 
(4) “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies[.]”  Id. (internal citations omitted).
29. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985); Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). 
30. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463) (1940)). 
31. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; see also Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two
Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 501, 509 (2015). 
32. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; see also Trammell, supra note 31, at 509.
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especially in regard to corporations.33  The Court did this in two 
cases, Goodyear and Daimler, in which it limited the states where 
personal jurisdiction can be properly asserted to: (1) the 
corporation’s principal place of business, (2) its incorporation 
state, or (3) where the corporation is “essentially at home.”34  
These increased jurisdictional requirements have functionally led 
to a narrowing of personal jurisdiction both for specific and 
general jurisdiction. 
This narrowing of specific and general jurisdiction has 
created a jurisdictional vacuum that courts are attempting to fill 
through other means.  Prior to Goodyear and Daimler, courts 
were filling the vacuum left by this narrowing primarily through 
expanding the scope of general jurisdiction.35  But since 
Goodyear and Daimler, some courts have been relying on other 
workarounds of the jurisdictional vacuum, including using a 
business’s registration as consent to personal jurisdiction.36  
Consent by registration comes from a relatively simple 
concept.  Every state has adopted a registration statute.37  
Typically, these registration statutes require the company to 
appoint a registered agent for service of process.38  Courts use 
either the registration to transact business or the appointment of a 
registered agent as evidence of consent to personal jurisdiction; 
functionally, however, there is no difference in the analysis 
because registration statutes require both the registration and the 
appointment to fully register as a foreign corporation.39 
33. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
34. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919, 924; see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
137 (2014). 
35. Trammell, supra note 31, at 511-12.
36. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 384 F. Supp. 3d 532, 534
(E.D. Pa. 2019); In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., MDL No. 2591, 2016 WL 
1047996, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2016); Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 581 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2018). 
37. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016); Gulf Coast
Bank & Tr. Co. v. Designed Conveyor Sys., LLC, Civ. Action No. 16-412-JJB-RLB, 2017 
WL 120645, at *3 (M.D. La. Jan. 11, 2017). 
38. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1503(a)(5) (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-20-
105 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-1503(a)(v) (2009). 
39. See Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1990);
see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1503(a)(5); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-20-105; WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 17-16-1503(a)(v). 
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In the pre-International Shoe era, the Supreme Court 
recognized consent by registration, holding in Pennsylvania Fire 
Insurance that a business assumed “the risk of the interpretation 
that may be put upon [the state’s registration statute] by the 
courts.”40  The Supreme Court reasoned that the business’s 
“voluntary act” of appointing an agent for service of process 
demonstrated consent to the jurisdiction of the forum state.41  
Even after International Shoe, lower courts continued the practice 
of allowing a company’s registration to serve as consent to 
general jurisdiction.42  In permitting registration to confer 
personal jurisdiction, courts have adopted various arguments.43  
However, the majority of courts that have allowed consent by 
registration primarily rely on the idea that the business is 
consenting to personal jurisdiction by registering in the state or 
appointing a registered agent.44 
One illustrative case is Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.45  
There, the Eighth Circuit reversed a trial court ruling that did not 
permit consent by registration.46  In allowing the corporation’s 
registration to serve as consent to personal jurisdiction, the 
Knowlton court reasoned that the Minnesota Supreme Court had 
interpreted their State’s registration statute to provide consent to 
personal jurisdiction by registering.47  Thus, by registering (and 
thereby appointing a registered agent) in Minnesota, the 
defendant had impliedly consented to personal jurisdiction.48  The 
40. Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Del. 1988); STX Panocean
(UK) Co., Ltd. v. Glory Wealth Shipping Pte. Ltd., 560 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2009); Bane 
v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640-41 (3d Cir. 1991).
43. One argument states that a business registering in that state qualifies as “minimum
contacts” with the forum state.  See Price v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co., 460 N.E.2d 
264, 269 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mortg. Co., 240 
So.2d 879, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).  This analysis confuses the tests for specific and 
general jurisdiction and is “functionally . . . resting its analysis on consent” alone, just 
through another name.  Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and 
the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1372-77 (2015). 
44. See, e.g., Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1107; STX Panocean, 560 F.3d at 131; Bane, 925
F.2d at 640.
45. Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1990).
46. Id. at 1200.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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court stated that “[o]ne of the most solidly established ways of 
giving such consent is to designate an agent for service of process 
within the State.”49  The court infers this consent to general 
jurisdiction by reasoning that it is unnecessary for a foreign 
corporation to be mandated to register an agent for service if the 
corporation is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the 
state.50 
Before Goodyear and Daimler, the use of consent by 
registration was not a significant issue, as courts would generally 
bypass the narrowing of specific jurisdiction by expanding the use 
of general jurisdiction.51  But since the narrowing of general 
jurisdiction in Goodyear and Daimler, courts have been forced to 
turn to other methods of obtaining personal jurisdiction, such as 
consent by registration.52 
III.  ISSUES WITH THE USE OF CONSENT BY
REGISTRATION 
While the use of consent by registration has become 
increasingly tenuous following the due process concerns outlined 
in Daimler and Goodyear,53 the practice of consent by registration 
has significant issues by itself aside from the due process 
concerns.  Part III will consider these problems, namely (A) the 
broad nature of consent by registration when that consent extends 
to general jurisdiction, (B) the registration statutes’ lack of clarity 
on the jurisdictional effects of registration, and (C) the coercion 
on foreign businesses to register through harsh penalties. 
49. Id. at 1999.
50. Knowlton, 900 F.2d at 1999.
51. See, e.g., Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1175 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding assertion of general jurisdiction reasonable where the defendant engaged in 
political and social activity in the forum state). 
52. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018);
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, Civ. Action No. 14-508-LPS, 2015 WL 880599, 
at *12 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015). 
53. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011);
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-39 (2014); see also, e.g., Brown v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 641 (2d Cir. 2016); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 
148 (Del. 2016). 
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A. Difference between Consent to Specific Jurisdiction and
General Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court has long permitted a defendant to 
expressly or implicitly consent to personal jurisdiction.54  There 
are two widely accepted methods of giving consent to personal 
jurisdiction: actual submission to a court’s authority and consent 
through a forum selection clause in a contract.55  When compared 
to these two methods of obtaining consent from a defendant, 
consent by registration stands out as an overly broad and unfair 
method of obtaining consent to personal jurisdiction. 
The first and most widely accepted method of consenting to 
personal jurisdiction is the defendant’s act of submission to the 
court’s authority.56  Similar to a waiver, a defendant may submit 
to a court’s authority by making an appearance in the court.57  For 
example, the Seventh Circuit stated that, in evaluating whether a 
defendant has consented by submission to the court’s authority, 
the “defendant must give a plaintiff a reasonable expectation that 
it will defend the suit on the merits or must cause the court to go 
to some effort that would be wasted if personal jurisdiction is later 
found lacking” in order “[t]o waive or forfeit a personal 
jurisdiction defense[.]”58  In submission cases, a defendant knows 
with a great degree of particularity both the party that initiated the 
lawsuit and the nature of the claim made against him before 
deciding to submit to the court’s authority.59  After all, a 
defendant cannot legally contest any facts or claims in a particular 
lawsuit prior to the lawsuit being initiated by a known party with 
a specific claim against the defendant. 
The second relatively uncontroversial method of consent to 
personal jurisdiction is consent by contract through forum 
54. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) (“[A]
litigant may give ‘express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court.’”); Ins. 
Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703-04 (1982). 
55. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1380-81.
56. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (“A person may
submit to a [s]tate’s authority in a number of ways.  There is, of course, explicit consent.”). 
57. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Williams, 417 P.3d 1033, 1045 (Kan. 2018).
58. Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hous. Metroplex,
P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010).
59. See id.; Monestier, supra note 43, at 1383.
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selection clauses, which occurs when a party negotiating a 
contract includes a clause limiting the forum where a lawsuit may 
be sustained.60  For example, whenever negotiating a commercial 
contract, Apple Inc. may include an enforceable forum selection 
clause that requires all claims arising from the contract to be 
litigated in California.61  This clause has the effect of obtaining 
express consent from both contracting parties to litigate any 
disputes in a particular forum or a limited number of forums.62  
Notably, while these clauses are generally held enforceable and 
controlling,63 they are not inherently valid where the forum 
selection clause is unreasonable.64  Many courts employ a specific 
analysis when determining whether a forum selection clause is 
valid and enforceable.65  However, similar to the submission 
method, even if a court finds a forum selection clause enforceable 
and the party’s consent to personal jurisdiction valid, the consent 
obtained through this clause still deals with a known party in 
regard to a specifically contemplated dispute.66 
In stark contrast stands the problematic consent by 
registration.  Unlike the consent obtained through submission and 
forum selection clauses, parties who register to do business 
engage with the forum state itself, without any knowledge of the 
type of disputes that could arise or the parties that would file suit 
against them.67  
60. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1380.
61. Dace Int’l, Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d 234, 242 (1995).
62. See id. at 236-37.
63. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985); Atl. Marine
Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 63 (2013). 
64. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
65. See Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2014) (analyzing a
forum selection clause using a four-part test involving (1) notice to the parties, (2) “whether 
the clause is ‘mandatory or permissive,’” (3) whether the claims arose under the 
clause/contract, and (4) whether the enforcement of the clause would be substantially 
unreasonable or inconvenient); Wong v. PartyGaming, Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 
2009) (analyzing a forum selection clause using three factors: (1) whether the contract 
process was flawed, (2) whether the chosen forum would be unfair, and (3) whether the 
chosen forum would be substantially inconvenient). 
66. See Hunter v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 190, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“A company’s submission to jurisdiction and service of process in New York pursuant only 
to isolated contracts does not thereby signal its unrestricted consent to personal jurisdiction 
in New York for all future claims brought against it.”). 
67. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1383-84.
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In other words, both submission and forum selection clauses 
are similar to consenting to specific jurisdiction, while consent by 
registration infers consent to general jurisdiction.68  In the case of 
submission, the consenting party knows the party making a claim 
against him and the nature of the specific claim.69  In the case of 
forum selection, while the consenting party may not know the 
exact claim that would be made against him, the consenting party 
knows the other party that would make the claim and that the 
claim relates to or arises under the disputed contract.70  However, 
when considering consent by registration, the registering 
corporation knows neither the party that would make the claim 
against it nor the alleged claim.71  Consent by registration opens 
the consenting party up to lawsuits from any party concerning any 
dispute, regardless of whether the claim relates to the forum state 
or not.72  It is the broad nature of this consent that distinguishes 
consent by registration from consent by submission and consent 
by forum selection clause. 
Consent by registration is the only method that allows 
consent to general jurisdiction.73  And, as will be discussed in 
more detail below,74 the alleged consent obtained through 
registration may not be truly genuine to begin with.  Consent by 
registration should not be permitted when considering the 
overarching and broad consequences involved, especially given 
that the only other methods of consenting to personal jurisdiction 
concern more specific and particularized circumstances. 
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See Hunter, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 201 (“A company’s submission to jurisdiction and
service of process in New York pursuant only to isolated contracts does not thereby signal 
its unrestricted consent to personal jurisdiction in New York for all future claims brought 
against it.”). 
71. See Monestier, supra note 43, at 1384.
72. See, e.g., Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 632 (2d Cir. 2016)
(Alabama resident claiming negligence against a Maryland corporation in Connecticut 
federal court).  
73. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1384.
74. See infra Part III.B-C.
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B. Registration Statutes Are Unclear or Vague
Even if one believes courts should allow this broad implied 
consent by registration, the current statutes are likely too vague to 
support an inference of consent.  These statutes’ lack of clarity 
has led commenters to question whether foreign businesses are 
sufficiently on notice in order to provide valid consent.75  Only 
two states—Kansas76 and Pennsylvania77—have statutes 
requiring explicit consent to personal jurisdiction through a 
foreign corporation’s registration.  All other state registration 
statutes are silent as to the jurisdictional effects of registering as 
a foreign company.78  In a typical registration statute, standard 
language includes: “[a] foreign corporation may not transact 
business in this state until it obtains a certificate of authority from 
the Secretary of State.”79  While the statutes generally go on to 
define the term “transacting business[,]” these statutes do not 
mention the jurisdictional effects of registering.80 
This silence in the registration statutes fails to put a foreign 
corporation on notice that the registration may serve as consent to 
75. See Monestier, supra note 43, at 1382-83.
76. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7931 (2016).  Subsection (g) requires the registering foreign
corporation to attach an “irrevocable written consent” to personal jurisdiction as part of the 
corporation’s registration application.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7931.It should be noted that 
commentators are not in agreement as to whether Kansas’ statute gives explicit consent.  See 
Monestier, supra note 43, at 1368 n.121 (arguing that the language of the statute is subject 
to other plausible interpretations, such as that the statute only gives consent to service of 
process).  This Article, however, will treat the Kansas statute as giving explicit consent, as 
the Kansas Supreme Court held that the statute gives explicit consent.  Merriman v. 
Crompton Corp., 146 P.3d 162, 171-77 (Kan. 2006).  Further, the statute requires the 
registering corporation to affirmatively give “an irrevocable written consent . . . that actions 
may be commenced against it in the proper court of any county where there is proper venue 
by the service of process on the secretary of state . . . and stipulating and agreeing that such 
service shall be taken and held, in all courts, to be as valid and binding as if due service had 
been made upon the [officers] of the . . . entity.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7931(g). 
77. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301 (1981) (Subsection (a)(2)(i) allows Pennsylvania courts
to have personal jurisdiction over corporations “[i]ncorporat[ed] under or qualifi[ed] as a 
foreign corporation under the laws of [Pennsylvania.]”).  Notably, while the language does 
provide explicit notice to registering foreign corporations, this language is not located in the 
registration statute, potentially creating a notice issue even in an explicit consent jurisdiction. 
78. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1387.
79. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1501(a) (1987).
80. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1501(b); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-1 (1975);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-920(b) (2014). 
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personal jurisdiction in the state.81  If a corporation does not know 
that registration could serve as consent to personal jurisdiction,82 
then the consent itself is suspect.  How can consent be genuine if 
the party lacks any kind of notice that it is giving consent?83 
Some courts have argued that, while the corporation has no 
actual notice of the jurisdictional effects of registration, the 
corporation does not need actual notice or may even have 
constructive notice of the effects of registration.84  This reasoning 
is founded in the idea articulated by the Supreme Court pre-
International Shoe that the registering corporation “takes the risk 
of the interpretation that may be put upon it by the courts.”85  
Several courts have used this notion to support the idea that the 
corporation consented to the state’s personal jurisdiction, even 
where there was no notice to the corporation prior to its 
registration.86  This reasoning, however, ignores two significant 
issues.  First, this argument relies on retroactive implicit consent.  
Second, this language comes from a pre-International Shoe 
decision that the Court has not since reexamined.87 
In the foremost article on consent by registration, Professor 
Tanya Monestier noted the problem of a corporation’s registration 
providing retroactive consent without being given notice:   
[T]his notion of consent is contradictory, because it
premises jurisdiction on the corporation’s prior consent,
but then holds that the scope of this consent will not be
established until the state court has interpreted the
registration statute.  In other words, this conception
81. See Monestier, supra note 43, at 1387-88.
82. Especially when considering the consent is to a broader and more overarching type
of personal jurisdiction.  See infra Part III.A. 
83. This lack of notice could also raise procedural due process issues, as the registering
corporation loses the right to contest personal jurisdiction in the forum state without any 
notice that the corporation has lost this right.  See generally Robin J. Effron, The Lost Story 
of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction, 74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 23 (2018). 
84. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018);
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, Civ. Action No. 14-508-LPS, 2015 WL 880599, 
at *12 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015). 
85. Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917).
86. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990);
Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 861 P.2d 270, 273 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). 
87. See Pa. Fire Ins., 243 U.S. at 96.
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forces a foreign corporation to agree to a condition 
before that condition has been established. 
Consent must mean that one knows what one is 
consenting to.  This is especially the case when one’s 
actions are retroactively deemed to constitute consent 
to something.88 
This implicit consent relies on the presumption that if a 
corporation appoints a registered agent for service of process, 
then the corporation implicitly accepts service, and therefore 
personal jurisdiction, for any lawsuits served to that agent.89  The 
Eighth Circuit has stated “[t]he whole purpose of requiring 
designation of an agent for service is to make a nonresident suable 
in the local courts[,]” and, therefore, a company’s appointment of 
a registered agent confers consent to personal jurisdiction.90  
However, states originally used business registration as a method 
of mimicking presence in the era dominated by the territorial 
approach to personal jurisdiction.91  This presence imitation 
allowed the forum state to point to the business’s acceptance of 
process through its appointed agent as evidence that the 
corporation had affirmatively consented to jurisdiction in the 
state.92  In an era dominated by territorial thinking, courts needed 
to use this consent/presence argument to exert any reasonable 
authority over foreign companies.93  However, continuing a 
practice that courts used in the pre-International Shoe territorial 
era seems unwise.94  The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning also ignores 
the important consideration that registering corporations are 
effectively coerced into registering an agent, a distinction that will 
be explored in more depth later in this Article.95 
Further, even if there is a prior case allowing consent by 
registration that could serve as constructive notice to the foreign 
corporation, this would not serve as sufficient notice that a 
88. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1389.
89. Knowlton, 900 F.2d at 1199.
90. Id.
91. See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 632 (2d Cir. 2016).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138 n.18 (2014).
95. See infra Part III.C; see also Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal
Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1074-75 (2012). 
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corporation consents to personal jurisdiction by registering to do 
business in a state.96  Often, these courts point to solitary lower 
court opinions to support the notion of constructive notice.97  This 
should not qualify as sufficient notice to foreign corporations for 
multiple reasons.  
First, courts often decided these older decisions prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Goodyear and Daimler.98  It would 
not be unreasonable for a foreign corporation to surmise that these 
recent Supreme Court decisions significantly changed the validity 
of these prior cases.  This is especially true given that these 
Supreme Court decisions did change the use of consent by 
registration in several states.99  Second, the registration statute 
itself gives no actual notice to foreign corporations of the 
jurisdictional effects of registration.100  This contravenes Supreme 
Court precedent stating parties must “have ‘fair warning that a 
particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a 
foreign sovereign[.]’”101  Using older, pre-Daimler intermediate 
appellate decisions as a form of constructive notice in lieu of any 
type of notice in the registration statute itself does not seem to 
meet the standard of a sufficient “fair warning” under Supreme 
Court precedent.102 
Some courts have observed this lack of notice issue when 
ruling to discontinue the use of consent by registration.103  For 
instance, in Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the Second Circuit 
compared Connecticut’s registration statute to Pennsylvania’s.104  
96. See Brown, 814 F.3d at 634-35, 637, 641; see also Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137
A.3d 123, 125-26, 148 (Del. 2016).
97. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018)
(citing a twenty-six-year-old New Mexico Court of Appeals case allowing consent by 
registration); see also Brown, 814 F.3d at 634-35, 641 (analyzing a Connecticut Appellate 
Court decision allowing consent by registration and declining to allow consent by 
registration without direct judicial authority from the Connecticut Supreme Court). 
98. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 458 P.3d at 581 (relying on a New Mexico Court of Appeals
case from 1993); see also Brown, 814 F.3d at 634-35 (analyzing a Connecticut Appellate 
Court opinion from 2009). 
99. See, e.g., Brown, 814 F.3d at 641; Genuine Parts, 137 A.3d at 148.
100. See Monestier, supra note 43, at 1366, 1368.
101. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citing Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
102. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Rodriguez, 458 P.3d at 581.
103. See, e.g., Brown, 814 F.3d at 637; Genuine Parts, 137 A.3d at 136.
104. Brown, 814 F.3d at 637.
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In holding that consent by registration was no longer a valid 
practice in the Second Circuit, the Brown court stated the 
Connecticut statute “gives no notice to a corporation registering 
to do business in the state that the registration might” be used as 
consent for personal jurisdiction.105 
If a foreign corporation registers under a statute that does not 
explicitly give notice to the corporation of the jurisdictional 
effects of registering, courts should not impute onto the 
corporation implicit consent to personal jurisdiction.  Further, 
even a statute that expressly states the jurisdictional effects may 
be improperly coercing that consent from the corporation or 
violating the Supreme Court precedent set by Goodyear and 
Daimler.106 
C. Registration May Be Coerced
Even assuming a statute is unambiguously clear on the 
jurisdictional effects of registration and provides explicit consent 
from the foreign corporation, that consent may still not be genuine 
due to the coercive nature with which states obtain registration 
from a foreign corporation.  First, given that an overwhelming 
majority of states do not have an explicit consent statute, these 
states obtain the registration without giving any notice to the 
registering corporation.107  Second, even in explicit consent 
jurisdictions, states create and enforce significant penalties for 
foreign companies doing business in the state without properly 
registering.108 
As discussed above, nearly every state’s registration statute 
fails to discuss the jurisdictional effects of registration and fails 
to give foreign corporations adequate notice of the jurisdictional 
consequences of registration.109  While this lack of notice casts 
doubt on the validity of the consent by itself, this problem is 
105. Id.
106. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-39 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 
107. See supra Part III.B.
108. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1502 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 378
(2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20 (1978); see also Andrews, supra note 95, at 1074-75. 
109. Every state other than Kansas and Pennsylvania has a registration statute that
gives no explicit notice.  See supra Part III.B. 
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compounded by the coercive effects of failing to give notice.  If a 
foreign company is required to register with the state before 
transacting any business and the company is not properly 
informed of the consequences of registering, then the state is 
engaging in coercive actions by deeming that registration to 
implicitly give consent to personal jurisdiction in that state.110  As 
noted by commentators, neither the registration statutes 
themselves111 nor the required paperwork for registering112 
require the business to give any level of consent to personal 
jurisdiction.  When the state fails to give proper notice of consent 
by registration to foreign companies, it fails to inform the 
companies of all the relevant facts in making the decision to 
register.  Therefore, to some degree this failure to inform coerces 
a business into making the decision to register.113  
Even in explicit consent jurisdictions, states may also engage 
in coercive conduct by penalizing foreign corporations for failing 
to register in the state.114  Every state has codified penalties for 
companies conducting business in the state without registering.115  
While there is some variance among the states as to what the 
particular penalties are, these penalties typically “include an 
inability of the defendant to sue in the state’s courts, the payment 
of a fine, and the tolling of the statute of limitations against the 
corporation.”116 
These legal penalties leave a foreign company with only 
three options: (1) do not register and do not transact any business 
in the state, (2) conduct business in the state without registering 
with the state, or (3) register and transact business within the state.  
The first option is economically inefficient, as it directly 
discourages companies from expanding into other states.  The 
second option subjects the corporation to legal penalties such as 
110. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1399.
111. Id. at 1387-88.
112. Id. at 1396.
113. See Andrews, supra note 95, at 1074-75.
114. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1502 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 378
(2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20 (1978). 
115. See Monestier, supra note 43, at 1365-66 & n.116; see also, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-27-1502; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 378; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20. 
116. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1366.
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fines and the inability to sue in the state’s courts.117  The third 
option allows the corporation to transact business in the state 
without fear of legal penalties from the state; however, it also 
subjects the corporation to general jurisdiction.118 
None of these options are particularly advantageous to a 
business considering registering in a state.  Further, the decision 
to register can create economically inefficient results.  There are 
two possibilities depending on whether the corporation is on 
notice of the jurisdictional effects of registration.  The first 
possibility assumes that the corporation is on notice of these 
jurisdictional effects.  In this scenario, the business is less likely 
to expand into other states due to the broad nature of consent by 
registration, thereby discouraging economic expansion and 
growth.119  Some companies have attempted to argue that this 
economic interference violates the dormant Commerce Clause 
with varying results.120  This argument is not often used and is 
still an evolving area of the law with conflicting outcomes.121  
However, even without this dormant Commerce Clause 
argument, the jurisdictional effects would still discourage 
economic growth. 
The other possibility assumes that the corporation is not on 
notice of the jurisdictional effects of registration.  Under this 
scenario, states implicitly concede that, while this does not 
discourage business registration and economic activity, 
corporations are not in fact on notice and therefore cannot give 
consent to personal jurisdiction, either implicitly or explicitly.122  
117. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1502; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 378; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20.  This is not to mention that it is typically not advisable for a party 
to engage in illegal conduct. 
118. See supra Part III.A.
119. See generally supra Part III.A.
120. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 578-580 (N.M. Ct. App.
2018) (holding the registration statute did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause); In re 
Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 2016 WL 2866166, at *5 (D. Kan. May 17, 2016) 
(holding the registration statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause); Hegna v. Smitty’s 
Supply, Inc., 2017 WL 2563231, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2017) (holding the registration 
statute does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause). 
121. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 458 P.3d at 578-580 (holding the registration statute did not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause); In re Syngenta, 2016 WL 2866166, at *5 (holding 
the registration statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause); Hegna, 2017 WL 2563231, 
at *5 (holding the registration statute does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause). 
122. See generally supra Part III.B.
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In either of these two possibilities, the state is either discouraging 
economic expansion or implicitly admitting that the corporation 
has no notice as to the jurisdictional effects of registering for 
business. 
This coercion poses a significant problem when considering 
the validity of a company’s consent to personal jurisdiction.  
While some level of government coercion may be acceptable in 
some areas,123 the coercion experienced in the consent by 
registration context is far more unreasonable in comparison.  
Consider issuing driver’s licenses for instance; state governments 
regularly impose restrictions and requirements on a person’s 
ability to drive on public roads.124  However, that coercion 
involves the state’s significant regulatory interest in maintaining 
the safety of the state’s roads and its citizens.125  In this context, 
the state does not have a significant regulatory interest in hearing 
lawsuits involving any cause of action from residents of any 
state.126   
A state may have a regulatory interest in hearing lawsuits 
involving its residents or involving conduct in its state, but the 
consent here is not limited to lawsuits that involve a state 
interest.127  Because the consent at issue here involves consent to 
general jurisdiction and not specific jurisdiction, this coercion 
appears especially unreasonable.  This lack of notice and the civil 
penalties and fines levied against non-registering companies 
effectively coerce the company into registering with the state, 
further questioning the validity of the business’s consent to 
personal jurisdiction.128 
123. See Alexander L. Mounts, A Safer Nation?: How Driver’s License Restrictions
Hurt Immigrants & Noncitizens, Not Terrorists, 37 IND. L. REV. 247, 249-50 (2003) 
(discussing the requirements state governments impose for obtaining a driver’s license). 
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1398 (“A state has no conceivable interest in
adjudicating a dispute that does not involve the state in any way or does not involve a 
defendant who has made the state its home.”). 
127. This argument is analogous to the evolution of Conflicts of Law, where courts
take a state’s policies and regulatory interests into account in examining whether to apply 
that state’s law.  See AARON D. TWERSKI & NEIL B. COHEN, CHOICE OF LAW 73-74 (2015). 
128. See Monestier, supra note 43, at 1387-89.
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IV.  CONSENT BY REGISTRATION CONTRAVENES
THE SPIRIT OF DAIMLER 
No state’s registration statute solves every one of the above-
mentioned issues.  Even Pennsylvania’s registration statute, 
which requires express consent of registering businesses and 
therefore avoids the notice issue, still fails to address the issue of 
allowing parties to consent to general jurisdiction or the economic 
and legal coercion that businesses may face in deciding to 
register.129  However, even if every one of the outlined problems 
had an implemented solution, consent by registration would still 
contravene recent Supreme Court precedent.130 
Just in 2011, the Supreme Court began limiting the scope of 
general jurisdiction.131  This began with Goodyear, where the 
Court articulated a strict definition of the contacts required for 
general jurisdiction, requiring a domicile-like presence that 
“render[s] [the corporation] essentially at home in the forum 
State.”132  In 2014, the Court cemented this domicile-like 
presence requirement, limiting where a corporation can be subject 
to general jurisdiction to a discrete set of forums: the 
incorporation state, its principal place of business, or where the 
corporations activities “render [it] essentially at home in the 
forum State.”133 
These two decisions significantly narrowed the ability of 
states to subject corporations to general jurisdiction.  Professor 
Tanya Monestier has argued that the recent shift “signal[s] a new 
direction for general jurisdiction—and one where it will be 
exceedingly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in 
circumstances other than the two traditional bases: place of 
129. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (1981); see 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 411
(2015) (penalizing non-registered foreign corporations); see also supra Part III.A. 
130. See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016); Genuine
Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 148 (Del. 2016); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 927 (2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 
117, 137-39 (2014). 
131. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; see also Jack B. Harrison, Registration, Fairness,
and General Jurisdiction, 95 NEB. L. REV. 477, 478-79 (2016). 
132. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416, (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
438, (1952).
133. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39.
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incorporation and principal place of business.”134  Through these 
decisions, the court implicitly rejects a corporation—even in the 
most exceptional cases—being subject to general jurisdiction in 
more than three states.135  In other words, this shift unequivocally 
disavows a doctrine that subjects a corporation to general 
jurisdiction in more than a few states and especially rejects a 
doctrine that would allow a business to be subject to nationwide 
general jurisdiction.136 
Courts have taken notice of this shift with differing results.  
A minority of courts have continued to permit consent by 
registration.137  These courts generally continue to employ the 
rationale used by pre-Daimler courts, arguing that whenever the 
corporation registers and appoints an agent for service of process, 
the corporation effectively consents to personal jurisdiction in 
that state regarding any lawsuit.138  Following Daimler, these 
courts further argue that no Supreme Court case overturns or 
further addresses Pennsylvania Fire Insurance’s holding that 
allowed consent by registration in the pre-International Shoe 
era.139  In the absence of a direct overruling of Pennsylvania Fire 
Insurance, courts have decided not to take it upon themselves to 
overrule Supreme Court precedent, even in situations where it 
seems warranted.140   
134. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1357; see Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19 (stating the
use of “at home” general jurisdiction on an out-of-state corporation will only occur in an 
“exceptional case”); see also Monkton Ins. Servs. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(stating it is “incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the 
place of incorporation or principal place of business” following Daimler). 
135. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39.
136. See id. at 139; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919-20.
137. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018);
Mitchell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 159 F.Supp.3d 967, 979 (E.D. Mo. 2016); Acorda Therapeutics, 
Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2016); AK Steel Corp. v. PAC 
Operating Ltd. P’ship, No. 2:15-CV-09260-CM-GEB, 2017 WL 3314294, at *4 (D. Kan. 
Aug. 3, 2017). 
138. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 458 P.3d at 580-82; Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 817 F.3d at
766-67 (O’Malley, J., concurring); Mitchell, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 976.
139. See, e.g., Freedom Transp., Inc. v. Navistar Int’l Corp., No. 2:18-CV-02602-JAR-
KGG, 2019 WL 4689604, at *18-20 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2019); see also Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917). 
140. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Navistar, Inc., No. 18-CV-321-KG/KBM, 2019 WL
1024285, at *6 (D.N.M. Mar. 4, 2019) (noting “‘[i]f a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has 
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of 
792 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:4 
However, lower courts that argue that they do not have the 
authority to overrule Supreme Court precedent ignore specific 
Supreme Court jurisprudence cautioning against continued 
reliance on pre-International Shoe decisions.  Since International 
Shoe, the Court has expressed doubt as to the continued authority 
of pre-International Shoe decisions, effectively disaffirming that 
older precedent.141  Courts overruling the practice of consent by 
registration have found that, while the Supreme Court has not 
explicitly overruled Pennsylvania Fire Insurance, the Court has 
functionally overruled the holding, considering both 
International Shoe and the recent doctrinal shifts seen in 
Goodyear and Daimler.142  These courts point out that even the 
Supreme Court has cautioned against following pre-International 
Shoe precedent “due to concerns that such cases were ‘decided in 
the era dominated by . . . territorial thinking.’”143  The Supreme 
Court has also warned that pre-International Shoe cases such as 
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance “should not attract heavy reliance 
today.”144  The Court’s recent decisions on personal jurisdiction 
heavily imply the danger of following precedent that contrasts 
with the spirit of current general jurisdiction doctrine. 
The most influential case rejecting consent by registration 
following Daimler is Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp.145  There, 
the Second Circuit interpreted a Connecticut statute, determining 
that consent by registration—especially where there was no 
explicit consent—violated due process under Daimler.146  The 
Brown Court concluded its Daimler due process analysis by 
decisions, the [lower court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the 
Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’”). 
141. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138 n.18 (2014).
142. See, e.g., Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 639 n.21 (2d Cir.
2016); DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2018 MT 219, ¶ 22, 392 Mont. 446, 426 P.3d 1, 8. 
143. DeLeon, 2018 MT 219, ¶ 22, 392 Mont. 446, 426 P.3d at 8 (quoting Daimler, 571
U.S. at 138 n.18). 
144. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138 n.18.
145. Brown, 814 F.3d at 640; see In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. No. VI, 384 F.
Supp. 3d 532, 539 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (citing Brown); Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, 182 F. 
Supp. 3d 166, 176 (D.N.J. 2016) (same); Magna Powertrain de Mex. S.A. de C.V. v. 
Momentive Performance Materials USA LLC, 192 F. Supp. 3d 824, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2016) 
(same); Perez v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 3:16-CV-00842-NJR-DGW, 2016 WL 
7049153, at *8-9 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2016) (same). 
146. Brown, 814 F.3d at 640-41.
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arguing that, because Daimler “rejected the idea that a 
corporation was subject to general jurisdiction in every state in 
which it conducted substantial business[,]” to permit consent by 
registration would effectively circumvent Daimler’s holding.147  
In allowing consent by registration, “Daimler’s ruling would be 
robbed of meaning by a back-door thief[,]” as it could subject a 
corporation to the power of any state where it registered.148 
The Second Circuit noted that “a carefully drawn state 
statute that expressly required consent to general jurisdiction as a 
condition on a foreign corporation’s doing business in the state 
. . . might well be constitutional.”149  But courts have even called 
express consent statutes into question since Daimler.150  
Following that decision, both the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
and the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania reexamined 
whether consent by registration still comports with due 
process.151  These courts have reached differing results.152  The 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, focusing on the coercive nature 
of the registration statute, held that Pennsylvania’s statute 
violated due process in light of Daimler.153  The court argued that, 
while the corporation gave consent “knowingly,” the consent runs 
the risk of not being “voluntary,” as the state conditions the ability 
to conduct business on the corporation forgoing its due process 
rights.154  Meanwhile, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has 
affirmed the practice of consent by registration.155  However, 
Pennsylvania state courts have increasingly begun reexamining 
147. Id. at 640.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 641.
150. In re Asbestos Prods., 384 F. Supp. 3d at 543 (rejecting consent by registration);
but see Webb-Benjamin, LLC v. Int’l Rug Grp., LLC, 192 A.3d 1133, 1139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2018) (affirming consent by registration). 
151. See In re Asbestos Prods., 384 F. Supp. 3d at 534; Bors v. Johnson & Johnson,
208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 652-53 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Webb-Benjamin, 192 A.3d at 1139. 
152. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab., 384 F. Supp. 3d at 534 (holding that consent by
registration, even with express consent, does not comport with due process following 
Daimler); Bors, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 653 (holding that consent by registration does comport 
with due process following Daimler); Webb-Benjamin, 192 A.3d at 1139 (same). 
153. In re Asbestos Prods., 384 F. Supp. 3d at 541-43.
154. Id. at 538, 542.
155. Webb-Benjamin, 192 A.3d at 1139.
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this issue, with the Pennsylvania Superior Court hearing an en 
banc reargument on the wisdom of consent by registration.156  
Following Daimler, it would be inconsistent for courts to 
continue the practice of consent by registration, even if the state 
uses an express consent statute.  Daimler declined to follow the 
principle that a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in 
every state in which it does a significant amount of business.157  
To allow consent by registration would make Daimler’s ruling 
toothless, as a corporation would be subject to personal 
jurisdiction in any state in which it is registered.158  
Further, when considering the due process issues in 
conjunction with the other issues with consent by registration, this 
practice does not comport with the foundational principle of 
fairness.159  As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has deeply 
rooted the concept of personal jurisdiction in “traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.”160  The Court even implicitly 
emphasized these ideals of fairness and justice in pre-
International Shoe cases before giving these ideals an explicit 
role in personal jurisdiction.161  In the context of specific 
jurisdiction, the Court has articulated specific factors for 
evaluating the fairness of a court exerting personal jurisdiction 
over a particular party.162  Time and again, the Court has declared 
its adherence to the concepts of fairness, justice, and 
156. See Murray v. Am. Lafrance, LLC, 234 A.3d 782, 785-87 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(granting an en banc reargument to examine whether to continue to allow consent by 
registration but ultimately dismissing the appeal without addressing the merits due to waiver 
of the issue by the defendant); see also K&L Gates LLP, En Banc Panel of the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court Gets Set for Reargument Regarding Business Registration as Consent to 
General Personal Jurisdiction, JD SUPRA (Oct. 28, 2019), [https://perma.cc/T2UX-PWRS]. 
157. See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016).
158. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-39 (2014).
159. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319 (1945); see also World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
160. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940));
see also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
161. See Effron, supra note 83, at 34-35, 43.
162. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (articulating four factors: (1) “the forum
State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” (2) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 
convenient and effective relief . . . at least when that interest is not adequately protected by 
the plaintiff’s power to choose the forum,” (3) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies[,]” and (4) “the shared interest of the 
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies[.]”). 
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reasonableness in the context of personal jurisdiction.163  But 
some courts seem to ignore these concerns when practicing 
consent by registration. 
The Court’s personal jurisdiction law intertwines a sense of 
“natural justice” with these ideals of fairness and 
reasonableness.164  While the Court sometimes crafts complex 
and seemingly convoluted specific jurisdiction tests, its 
fundamental goal in these tests is to produce a fair result.165  If 
courts have articulated fairness as the so-called “North Star” of 
personal jurisdiction, then fairness should be the guiding principle 
when examining personal jurisdiction.166  For example, instead of 
viewing Goodyear and Daimler as purely limiting a court’s 
authority in cases involving general jurisdiction, these decisions 
could be seen as using fairness to correct the course of general 
jurisdiction in today’s more global and interdependent world.167  
In other words, in these decisions the Court recognized and 
reaffirmed the role of fairness in personal jurisdiction in ruling a 
business in today’s global economy should not be subject to 
general jurisdiction in every state in which they do business.168  
This concept implicitly recognizes that fairness is a fluid ideal—
that, even if the practice of consent by registration was fair in a 
less interdependent and territorial-focused society, consent by 
registration no longer conforms to the touchstone of fairness and 
justice.169 
When analyzing consent by registration under a fairness 
framework, consent by registration is an inherently unfair 
practice.  As demonstrated throughout this Article, courts ignore 
163. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011); World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
164. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730 (1877); Effron, supra note 83, at 34.
165. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92, 297 (applying a
“minimum contacts” test influenced by “purposeful[] avail[ment]” and “foreseeability” 
despite articulating factors in evaluating fairness). 
166. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)). 
167. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-39 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 
168. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-38; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
169. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463); Brown v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 632 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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significant problems when using consent by registration.  From 
the broad nature of the consent, to the lack of notice and clarity in 
registration statutes, to the probable coercion in obtaining a 
business’s registration to the due process concerns following 
Goodyear and Daimler, the practice of consent by registration 
appears exceptionally unfair under a personal jurisdiction 
analysis.170  While consent by registration could be seen as “fair” 
for large corporations with vast resources, the practice still seems 
unfair due to its uneven application depending on the state and its 
impact to businesses without those vast resources.171  Why should 
we ignore this paramount concern of fairness and justice when it 
comes to personal jurisdiction obtained through consent, 
particularly when that consent is predicated on dubious 
presumptions and practices? 
V.  CONCLUSION
Courts reasonably want to use consent by registration, as the 
practice allows businesses to be haled into court where the current 
personal jurisdiction doctrine fails to confer the court 
jurisdiction.172  But consent by registration is ultimately an unfair 
conduit to obtain authority over parties, with problems such as the 
broad nature of the consent, lack of clarity on the effects of 
registration, the use of coercion to obtain registration, and the due 
process concerns following Goodyear and Daimler.173  Instead of 
using consent by registration, courts (with the Supreme Court’s 
guidance) could expand the use of specific jurisdiction or stream 
of commerce doctrine to correct the recent limiting of personal 
jurisdiction.174  But courts should not continue to use consent by 
registration to unfairly close the current jurisdictional gap.  Doing 
170. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
171. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 156 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
172. See id. at 143.
173. See id at 137-39; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
174. See generally Trammell, supra note 31, at 502; Shane Yeargan, Purpose and
Intent: Seeking a More Consistent Approach to Stream of Commerce Personal Jurisdiction, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 543 (2012). 
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so would circumvent the spirit of Daimler and our framework for 
due process and fairness.175  
175. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
